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Abstract
This thesis hypothesizes that shared democratic values and institutional
constraints, proposed as explanations by Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), should in
theory prevent small powers from engaging in physical conflict. However, because these
democracies are small and developing, these constraints may not influence outcomes in
the same way as they do in larger and more developed powers. To test this hypothesis, a
dyadic case study was conducted of the relationship between Turkey and Israel. Specific
focus was given to two related events, both of which could have resulted in a physical
conflict between the two countries: the May 2010 Flotilla incident and the release of the
United Nations Palmer Report. The study concluded that DPT can be said to have
limited applicability to small democratic powers, as issues such as balance of power,
self-interest and country size appear to play a larger role in determining outcomes even
when two states share some democratic norms.

Chapter 1- Case Study Design and Theoretical Frameworks
Introduction
One of the most debated subjects within the international relations community is
the effect democracy has on a country’s decision to go to war. Understanding how
democracy contributes to peace or war is a particularly important topic given recent US
history of building foreign policies around what is called the “Democratic Peace Theory”
(DPT). In his 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush stated:
“America is a nation with a mission - and that mission comes from our most basic
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beliefs…Our aim is a democratic peace...”1 This quote suggests that if all countries are
democracies, then war will cease to exist, because democracies do not fight one another.
Most of the literature on DPT is focused on relations between larger powers such
as the United States and the major European nations. There has been limited research on
small powers. Yet, today the United States, the dominant superpower over the last 20
years, is seeing a decline in its relative power. States such as Brazil, India, and China are
on the rise. With the world in transition, and with the rise of social movements around
the world, the importance of having a deeper understanding of how DPT relates to small
powers is apparent. General theories of DPT should be re-considered and re-tested with
small powers as a focus.
This thesis will explore whether DPT provides an adequate explanation for the
behavior of small democratic powers during times of potential physical conflict. It will
use the relationship between Turkey and Israel as its context, giving specific focus to two
events which brought the two into conflict, though not war. The study will begin with an
elaboration of DPT, and my research design. This will be followed by a brief history of
Turkish-Israeli relations, and an analysis of the two pertinent events.

Design
My hypothesis is that shared democratic values and institutional constraints,
proposed as explanations by DPT, should in theory prevent small powers from engaging
in physical conflict. However, because these democracies are small and developing,
these constraints may not influence outcomes in the same way as they do in larger and
1
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more developed powers. I will test the hypothesis by conducting a dyadic case study of
the Turkish-Israeli relationship. This relationship was chosen because both countries are
dynamic democracies with capable armies and legitimate security concerns. These
criteria are the basic elements of DPT. Countries with pressing military security concerns
are more conflict prone, both militarily and politically. Thus, they are ideal for such a
case study.
The case study will explore two related events between Turkey and Israel which
could have potentially led to physical conflict. The first is the Gaza Flotilla incident. In
May 2010 a flotilla of ships led by Turkish citizens attempted to breach the Israeli
blockade of the Gaza Strip, but was met by the Israeli navy. Eight Turkish nationals were
killed during the conflict that ensued following the boarding by Israeli commandos of one
of the ships. The second event that will be explored is the release of the United Nations
(UN) Palmer Report, which was an international investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the Flotilla incident. In both situations war seemed a possibility between
Turkey and Israel. This study will explore whether DPT played a role not just in averting
war between the two states, but also in reducing the level of hostility and escalation
during the crisis.

Contextual Theories and Clarifications
Power
In discussing DPT in the context of “small powers,” it is relevant to explain what
power is. Realists tend to characterize power in terms of control of material resources
with a major emphasis on military might. Liberals and constructivists, however, include

4

factors beyond military capacity, including economic and cultural “power.” Great
powers, which have more military, economic, political, and perhaps cultural, resources,
are understood to be able to influence the global political environment far more than
small powers like Turkey and Israel, which can be characterized as regional powers.
These have the ability to affect their respective regions, but their global influence is
limited.
Small powers may not be capable on all dimensions of power. However, they can
stay influential in their respective regions by relying more heavily on one defining
characteristic. For example, North Korea’s military capabilities are relatively strong, but
its economy is very weak. On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates has a strong oilbased economy, but it only has a standing army of 64,000 people.2 These countries are
important for one reason or another in their regions, but they lack the ability to influence
the international system.

Democracy
For a full understanding of this case study, an examination of democratic theory is
necessary. I will briefly review ancient Greek democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
participatory democracy, Robert Dahl’s pluralist democracy, Milton Friedman’s
protectionist democracy, and Joseph Schumpeter’s performance democracy.
Democracy’s roots stem from ancient Greece, where the Athenians set up a
system of representation under which the state was subject to “the rule of the people.”
Athenian society, however, was not a democracy by today’s standards. There were over
2
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10,000 resident foreigners and 150,000 slaves who were not entitled to representation.
Only men 18 years of age whose parents were Athenians could participate in the
democratic process.3 Today’s systems of democracy have since been altered to include
certain defining characteristics such as universal suffrage and choosing representatives
through free and fair elections.4
Shifting to more modern forms of democracy, participatory theory proposes that
“participation produces popular control of the issue-agenda, decision making, and
implementation” of policies in a democracy.5 According to the theory, not only does
participation lead to public control but it also has an educative influence that develops
and sustains public participation. The theory’s origins can be found in the works of
Rousseau and J.S. Mill.
For Rousseau, participation leads to popular control of the main political bodies,
because participation involves each member in the equal sharing of benefits and burdens.
Participation is crucial to a just society because it involves every member in deciding his
or her own best interest, and because it connects that interest to wider public interest.6
Justice results because free men force themselves to follow the self-prescribed laws,
which affect everyone equally. This process merges the public and private interests as
well as educates citizens and provides them with the personal resources and inspiration to
continually participate. For Mill, participation fulfills a protective and educative function
that leads to the development of involved, other-regarding citizens. Similar to Rousseau,
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Mill concludes that other-regarding behavior is formed by political institutions that
facilitate participation, and, in turn, that participatory institutions are self-sustaining.7
Pluralist democracy focuses on the location of power within society. Robert Dahl
has led the way in pluralism theory. He focused mostly on the American political
system, most notably in his book Who Governs?, in which he provides a case study of the
power structures of the city of New Haven, Connecticut. He determines that power is
spread out through various groups in society and that no one ruling elite can control
everything. Industrialization has advanced democracy and produced “a pattern of
dispersed rather than cumulative inequalities” and every group “has access to some
resources that it can exploit to gain influence,” wrote Dahl.8
While Dahl was a proponent of pluralism democracy, he did not believe that it
was the ideal form of democracy. His ideal form, he stated, was not conceivable in the
real world. He wrote that the ideal objectives of democracy were popular sovereignty,
political equality, and majority rule.9 He specified eight institutional guarantees within
the three dimensions of competition, participation, and civil liberties that would be
necessary to maximize attainment of the three objectives.
Claude Burtenshaw states that pluralist democracies give particular attention and
consideration to four specific things. First, that there should be no significant
concentration of power anywhere. Second, that there are slack resources everywhere,
which means no one is necessarily at a disadvantage: the opportunity to assume a position
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of leadership is accessible to anyone. Third, leaders have an incentive to do the bidding
of their constituents causing them to reflect on popular consensus. And fourth, that a
group of people who may feel persecuted will be stimulated to take advantage of
resources, and thus system tends to be “self-correcting.”10
Protectionist democracy puts an emphasis on the government’s role as a protector
of law. In his book Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman analogizes the role of
government in society to that of an umpire in a game. Like an umpire, the government’s
basic roles in a free society are “to provide a means whereby we can modify the rules, to
mediate differences among us on the meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance
with the rules on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game.”11 For
Friedman, democratic governments are there for the purpose of creating and enforcing
law, specifically laws which affect a person’s individual rights in the economic, property,
and goods and services spheres.
Freidrich Hayek, another protectionist democracy theorist, further emphasized the
government’s duty to legally protect public goods and services. As noted by Radnitzky,
Hayek theorizes that the government should be expected “to enforce the rules of ‘just’
conduct such as protection, security of property, etc….to render additional ‘highly
desirable’ services. Hayek considered such government service to be compatible with
‘liberal’ principles so long as the ‘wants satisfied are collective wants of the community
as a whole.”12 In this definition of the role of the state, Radnitzky adds, Hayek assumes
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that there will be some sort of agreed upon legal method or procedure through which the
public can express and communicate their interests and preferences. With that, the
widely agreed upon manner to find out what the public wants is through the democratic
method of one-man, one-vote, majority rule.13
Performance democracy emphasizes how democracies actually operate,
specifically the relationship between competing leaders and the public. Joseph
Schumpeter, the leading performance democracy theorist, states that democracy is
actually about “competitive leadership” and “the rule of the politician,” rather than mass
participation and popular rule. This “elite” focused form of democracy is driven by what
he termed the “democratic method.” “The democratic method is that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote,” wrote Schumpeter.14
He challenges what is referred to as “classic” democracy, or the idea that
democracy is a process by which the electorate identifies common goods, as decided by
the public, and is then carried out by politicians on their behalf. Instead, Schumpeter
states that the public has low levels of political knowledge, interest, and participation. As
a result the public is taken advantage of through the elites’ use of the democratic method.
Schumpeter stated that “elite groups and parties may be able to preside over a formally
democratic institutional arrangement, providing some measure of political competition,
but certainly not fulfilling the values of equality, participation, or human development.”15
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There are those who would argue that both Turkey and Israel do not constitute
true democracies. This notion, however, is contested. Western schools of thought
(which have for the most part dominated the study of international relations) tend to
structure their perceptions of democracy around the larger western powers such as the
United States, France, and Germany. However, their versions of democracy were built
around their own unique histories and set of societal experiences. While it is tempting to
discuss democracy in a general and global way, to do so would be insufficient.
Each region of the world has its own unique constraints, characteristics, and
histories; as a result democracy comes in all forms. Turkey and Israel may not be
traditional Western democracies, but they are democracies in their own right.
Furthermore, both Turkey and Israel reflect a combination of the traditional theories of
democracy as theorized by Robert Dahl, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Milton Friedman, and
Joseph Schumpeter. In both countries there is law for the protection of public goods and
services, power is spread out through various groups of society with no one ruling elite
controlling everything, and there is a process of elections in which all citizens have a say
in the rotation of ruling elites. It is important, however, to review some of the
controversies surrounding their democracies.
Israel has long been criticized for discriminatory practices against its domestic
Arab populations. Much of it is a result of distrust by the Israeli government because of
its 40 year conflict with the Palestinians. At the heart of the discrimination is unequal
allocation of resources. Housing, education, and income for Arab Israelis substantially
lag behind that of the Jewish majority. In March 2012, Arab Israeli attorney Keis Nasser
of the Arab Center for Law and Policy issued a report stating that based on research and
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official Interior Ministry reports, the government creates obstacles preventing the
development of Arab towns and villages in Israel. These obstacles then drive the Arab
communities to develop and expand illegally and without permits, resulting in their
inevitable destruction. The report also stated that only three of the 71 plans proposed in
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s housing reform are located in Arab
communities, and only three percent of the planned housing units are in Arab towns.16
On the issue of educational resource allocation, the 2007 Sikkuy equality index
reported that Israeli Arabs were only receiving around “71% of the education resources
due to them, based on their relative share in the population…”17 In 2009 a study
published by Professor Sorel Cahan of Hebrew University’s School of Education found
that the Education Ministry’s budget for special assistance to students from low
socioeconomic backgrounds gave only 20 percent the amount of assistance per student to
Arabs as it did to Jews.18
Israel also faces attacks on its democracy based on its occupation of the West
Bank. Israel, along with the United States, however, takes credit for ensuring democracy
in West Bank Palestinian politics. However, due to heavy involvement by the Israeli
military in day-to-day operations, this claim has been highly contested. Freedom of
travel inside the West Bank is severely restricted and there are serious issues over the
invasion of privacy.
16
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There is also the matter of Palestinian house demolitions by the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) inside the West Bank. Punitive demolitions, which are those conducted as a
response to persons suspected of taking part in, or directly supporting, terrorist or guerilla
activities are particularly controversial. They are meant to be a direct punishment for
terrorism, as well as a deterrent against future attacks. Punitive demolitions constitute 8.5
percent or 1,523, of defined demolitions between 1967 and 2010.19 Human rights groups
often argue that Israel is in breach of The Hague and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which
it is party to, by allowing punitive demolitions.20 More importantly, many of the
demolitions occur without a fair trial or right to a hearing for the home owner.21
Many also argue that the occupation of the West Bank erodes democracy inside
Israel proper as a result of settlement activity. The most recent development was the
passing of the controversial West Bank Settlement Boycott Law. Under the law, any
sponsor of a “geographically based boycott” of goods, including in Israel or its
settlements, could be sued for damages in civil court by the party injured in the boycott
proclamation. Several rights groups and international law experts have stated that the
legislation is a breach of freedom of speech.22
Turkey is also criticized for some of its democratic failures. The most discussed
issue revolves around Turkey’s sizable Kurdish minority, which makes up around 18

19
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percent of the total population.23 Turkey has been fighting a war with the Kurdish
separatist party the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) since 1984. Turkish resentment
stemming from the conflict has found its way into discriminatory treatment of the
domestic Kurdish minority. Restrictive laws limit free speech, prevent the teaching of
minority languages, such as Kurdish, in school, and require political parties to secure an
insurmountable 10 percent of the nationwide vote to gain a seat in parliament. This has
led to a significant inability of Kurdish parties to achieve any meaningful status in the
Turkish parliament. Instead, many Kurds in parliament were forced to run as
independent candidates, who can then form a minimum 20-seat party grouping once in
office.24
Over the last three years, the Turkish government has been accused of misusing
anti-terrorism laws to bring criminal charges against ordinary civilians who engage in
legitimate and nonviolent pro-Kurdish political activity. Thousands are on trial for their
affiliation with the Turkey Assembly of the Union of Kurdistan Communities, accused of
being the PKK’s urban wing. Many of the defendants are activist members, officials and
serving elected mayors of the legal Peace and Democracy Party, which formed a group in
parliament after winning 36 seats as independents in the recent June 2011 election.25
Turkey is also the target of continued international condemnation for its
burgeoning hostility towards the media. In January 2012, the New York Times reported
that there were 97 members of the news media in Turkish prison.26 This includes
23
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journalists, publishers, and distributers. Turkish authorities have also given Internet
service providers and website hosts a list of 138 keywords that are forbidden.27
Over the last year, the arrest of German-born journalist Nedim Sener has garnered
substantial attention from the international media. In 2010 Sener won the International
Press Institute’s World Press Freedom Hero award for his reporting on the murder of
Hrant Dink, a well-known Turkish-Armenian journalist who was assassinated in Istanbul
in 2007.28 Sener stands accused of being part of the group Eregenekon, which the ruling
party believes was plotting to overthrow the government. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s opponents state that he is using the foiled plot to round up and eliminate his
critics and opposition.
Finally, it has been common place over the last 40 years for the military to
overthrow a ruling party or coalition that is believed to threaten the secular nature of the
country. However, this has not happened since 1997.

Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic Peace Theory is one of the principal paradigms of the Liberal school
of thought within international relations. The theory states that democracies are unlikely
to fight each other due to their shared democratic norms, which they externalize
internationally, and institutional constraints that democracies create. Various theorists
have placed different levels of emphasis on which reason is more predominant, shared
New York Times, Jan. 4, 2012, Accessed Mar. 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/world/europe/turkeys-glow-dims-as-government-limits-freespeech.html?pagewanted=all.
27
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24, 2011, Accessed Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/article/160897/turkey-mediacensorship-rampant-and-internet-isnt-free.
28
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democratic norms or institutional constraints. In general, history suggests that DPT does
in fact hold up; democracies are unlikely to fight each other. However, it is the causal
logic behind it that is debated.
There are two ways of conducting research on DPT, through dyadic or monadic
studies. Dyadic research on DPT explores only the likelihood of whether democracies
will fight one another. The research matches up individual democracies and explores
their individual relationships. Comparatively, monadic research studies a democracy’s
relationship with all regime types, and explores whether democracies are a more peaceful
as a whole. This study will be conducted on the claims of dyadic studies, though brief
insight into the competing frameworks is appropriate.

Dyadic vs. Monadic Studies
Monadic studies of DPT explore whether democracies are less prone to physical
conflict in general, regardless of the opposition’s regime type. On the other hand, those
who study DPT dyadically suggest that while democracies are less prone to fight each
other, this has little to no bearing on their willingness to go to war with other regime
types. David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul Huth conducted a study
in which they assessed whether DPT is purely dyadic, monadic, or a mixture of the two.
The model directly compared the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as
the unit of analysis, rather than a dyad. It also controlled for an important, but what they
claim is overlooked variable, satisfaction with the status quo.
What the study found was that in general, there was ample support for the
argument that DPT is primarily a dyadic process, specifically when addressing the
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escalation of international crisis. They claimed that “once a democracy is involved in an
international crisis, it carefully distinguishes the type of state with which is bargaining
and adjusts its bargaining behavior accordingly. When faced with a democratic
opponent, a democracy believes that its opponent shares its desire to avoid the use of
force.”29 However, their examination of the satisfaction with the status quo variable
does indicate that there may be significant monadic effects for the initiation of crises.
Their results suggest that democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of
states, but once involved in a crisis, “democracies are clearly less likely to initiate
violence only against other democracies.”30 They do state that the theoretical
groundwork for such a study is limited and needs more development.
Kenneth Benoit states in “Reexamining Democracy and War Involvement:
Democracies Really Are More Pacific,” that democracies are less likely to go to war in
general than other regime types. In his study, Benoit systematically reviews a series of
empirical works, specifically Small and Singer (1976), Rummel (1983), Chan (1984), and
Weede (1984), exploring conflicts between 1960 and 1980, and argues that democracies
fight no fewer wars than non-democratic regime types. Benoit created his own
quantitative model, combining models previously created by Butterworth, Small-Singer,
Bollen, and Freedom House to test whether the aforementioned theorists’ evidence, was
correct.31
What Benoit concluded was that regime type does explain variation in
international conflict, and that previous conventional wisdom, which was absent of
29

David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul Huth, “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the
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30
Ibid, 527
31
Kenneth Benoit, “Democracies Really Are More Pacific: Reexamining Democracy and War
Involvement,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40.4 (Dec. 1996): 636-642.

16

monadic-level studies, deserved to be reconsidered. He gives a word of caution, though,
that all studies must carefully consider the testing spectrum as democracies only make up
20-30 percent of all regimes.32

Arguments in Favor of Democratic Peace Theory
In 1791 Thomas Paine wrote The Rights of Man, in which he states that the “war
system’ was contrived to preserve the power and the employment of princes, statesmen,
soldiers, diplomats and armaments manufacturers, and to bind their tyranny ever more
firmly upon the necks of the people.”33 In other words, wars allowed for increased
government control over citizens.
Immanuel Kant’s essay, Perpetual Peace, largely recognized as the foundation of
DPT, offered a remedy to what Paine laid forth. The essay suggests that an international
system of interconnected republican constitutions would result in a world “perpetual
peace.” Generally, liberals believe that peace is the normal state of affairs, contrary to
their realist counterparts. But as Bruce Russett and John Oneal point out, Kant was
realistic. He acknowledged that war was inherent in the anarchic international system.
He simply cautioned nations to act wisely until a league of interdependent republics was
established. He also knew that power politics only produced temporary respite from
conflict, not permanent solutions.34 Kant’s belief was that the construction of republican
governments, ones in which leaders were accountable and individual rights were
guaranteed, would result in peaceful international relations.
32
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There was a resurgence of interest and discussion in Kant’s essay in the mid
1980s, spearheaded by Michael Doyle. Liberalism and World Politics, Doyle’s most
acknowledged work, reviews three different forms of liberalism using Machiavelli,
Schumpeter, and Kant as his prime figures. He concludes that Kant’s proposal of liberal
republicanism, as well as his views on politics, should be the standard for how regimes
strive to be. The basis of his argument revolves around Kant’s three “definitive articles”
as laid out in Perpetual Peace. The first article requires a state to be a republic.
According to Doyle’s interpretation of Kant, a republic should be a:
…political society that has solved the problem of
combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social
order. A private property and market-oriented economy
partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The
public, or political, sphere was more troubling. [Kant’s]
answer was a republic that preserved juridical freedom…on
the basis of a representative government with a separation
of powers.35

The second article calls for some form of a union of republics, what Kant calls the
“pacific federation,” or foedus pacificum. This pacific federation would establish a zone
of peace amongst already existing republics, with the goal of ultimately converting and
bringing in new republics. The zone of peace would facilitate certain levels of
interdependence, both political and economic, resulting in serious constraints and
incentives for republics not to go to war with each other.36 The third article deals with
universal hospitality. He states that foreigners should be welcomed and unharmed, and
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allowed to do business assuming it is within the law of the country.37 Doyle interprets
this third article to mean adherence to civil rights.38
In Liberalism and World Politics, Doyle provides empirical evidence to
corroborate Kant’s theory. The article has a three page appendix where all the liberal
regimes which have existed from 1700-1982 are listed and all the international wars since
1817 onwards are given chronologically. Based on his data he claims that “liberal states
are different. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would.”39
Doyle coined the term “separate peace,” differentiating the peace between allies who are
fighting an enemy from a liberal peace.
Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz’s “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986” was a significant dyadic quantitative study on DPT. They studied
pairs of independent democratic states that they deemed “relevant” democracies, or ones
that had real probabilities of going to war. There were roughly 265,000 dyad-years to
study; however, they deemed only 12 percent relevant. By placing numerical values on
regime type, executive constraints, and democratic norms, through various data sets they
were able to measure the probability of two states going to war or having a military
conflict. They also took into consideration state wealth, economic growth, alliances,
contiguity, and military capability. The specific time table was chosen for three reasons:
there were three times as many democracies to test in the second-half of the 20th century
than the first half; the role of democracy in restraining violent conflict between
democratic dyads may have been stronger in the second-half of the century because they

37

Ibid. 1158.
Michael Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” American Political Science Review, 99.3 (Aug.
2005): 463.
39
Doyle, 1986. 1151.
38

19

were given proper time to penetrate their respective states; and lastly in the second-half of
the century outside variables such as global wealth and growth, and deeper and farther
ranging alliance systems were put in place, and a few other variables could be more
highly accounted for.40
In the article they made three hypotheses; the first was a general hypothesis which
stated that the more democratic both members of a pair of states are, the less likely they
will have a militarized dispute, and the less likely it is that any disputes that do break out
will escalate. The second hypothesis dealt with the normative aspect of DPT. They
hypothesized that the more deeply rooted democratic norms are in the political processes
of the two states, the lower the likelihood that disputes will break out or escalate. The
third hypothesis dealt with the structural or institutional aspect of DPT. They
hypothesized that the higher the political constraints on the executives of the two states,
the lower the likelihood that disputes would break out or escalate.
Based on the results of the study, Russett and Maoz made four conclusions. First,
the relative lack of conflict and war between democracies “…is probably not a spurious
correlation. When controlling for other confounding factors, regime type has a consistent
dampening effect on international conflict.”41 Second, the results were robust, regardless
of which data set was used, the definition of the dependent variable, and the scale and
type of measure of democracy. Third, both political constraints and democratic norms
are good explanations for why democracies do not fight each other. And fourth,
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normative explanations may be a better overall account of DPT than structural
explanations.42

Arguments Against Democratic Peace Theory
In “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” Sebastian Rosato provides a
qualitative analysis arguing against the causal logic of DPT. In his paper, he explores the
roles of norm externalization, which refers to states externalizing their shared democratic
norms, as well as the role of institutional constraints. On norm externalization, Rosato
explores liberal states’ adherence to liberal norms and the theory that democracies only
go to war when “their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist
policies of outlaw states.”43
He analyzes a data set of imperial wars involving the liberal European
democracies, Britain and France, and the United States, spanning from 1838 to 1920 in
order to explore their intention in going to war. In the data set he uses a system created by
Adam Przeworsky (2000) to code states as democratic or nondemocratic. When the
coding is not sufficient he uses the criteria provided by studies of other DPT proponents
such as Russett (1993) and Dixon (1994). Rosato acknowledges that some theorists have
claimed these countries were not sufficiently liberal in the period analyzed in order to
conduct such a study. But, he argues that they are in fact considered to be classic liberal
democracies, and “if they cannot be expected to behave in a liberal fashion, then few, if
any, states can.”44 What Rosato finds is that the wars explored were not fought out of a
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sense of norm externalization, but instead out of territorial ambition, the need to create
buffer areas between an enemy, and competition with other imperial powers.45
In analyzing democratic norm externalization Rosato gives specific attention to
the claims that liberal democracies trust and respect one another. He explores a data set
of American Cold War interventions against other democracies. He states that the US
mission to contain the spread of communism overtook the respect for democracy. Had it
not been the case he argues, the United States would not have become involved, as “none
of the target states had turned to communism or joined the communist bloc, and were led
by what were at most left-leaning democratically elected governments…”46 Rosato also
criticizes liberal theorists that attempt to use perception and regime defining tactics, as
they are too unstable and inaccurately assessed.47
Rosato focuses his argument against the institutional logic of DPT on five causal
mechanisms that proponents of DPT consider to be behind the institutional logic, all
relating to leadership accountability: constraints by pacific publics, constraints by antiwar
groups, the fact that democracies are believed to be slow to mobilize militarily,
democracies are open societies and are incapable of launching surprise attacks, and
because of the free flow of information democracies avert wars.48
First, Rosato tests the theory that democratic leaders are more accountable than
their autocratic counterparts. He uses a modified dataset of Goemans’s 2000 work, War
and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. In his
analysis, Rosato found scant evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs
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from fighting losing or costly wars. He states that based on the results of the study,
autocratic leaders are likely to suffer more severe punishment for losing or taking part in
a costly war.49
On the issue of public constraint, Rosato states that there are three reasons why
public opinion does not constrain democracies from engaging in war. First, the costs of
war typically fall on a small subset of the population that will likely be unwilling to
protest government policy. Second, any public aversion to incurring the costs of war may
be overtaken by the effects of nationalism. And third, democratic leaders are as likely to
lead as to follow public opinion.50 On group constraint, Rosato analyzes how societal
actors contribute to state behavior. Based on previous studies Rosato concludes that
while a state is a representative body, it is imperfect and more likely to represent groups
that are better organized or have more at stake in an issue. Thus, “there is no reason to
believe that pacific interest groups will generally win out over pro[-]war groups.”51 He
then corroborates this with instances in where proponents of foreign aggression in
democracies prevailed and a study in which he finds that autocracies are actually more
often represent groups that have a vested interest in avoiding foreign wars.52
Democracies have no trouble mobilizing if necessary, according to Rosato. He
corroborates this notion by exploring the wars of the United States relying predominantly
on the work of John Rourke. The US has taken military action abroad 200 times during
its history, and only five of these were declared by Congress. Most were authorized
unilaterally. As such, Rosato claims that “checks and balances have generally failed to
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operate and there have been frequent violations of the spirits if not the letter of the
resolution,” and that democratic leaders have a history of acting swiftly and decisively if
need be.
Rosato also argues that democracies have no problem completing surprise attacks.
He cites several examples of successful democratic surprise attacks and uses Ephraim
Kam’s work to support the notion that regime type does not matter, because attacks
achieve surprise based on the opposition’s inability to evaluate information.53 Rosato
uses similar argumentation for why the free flow of information also does not constrain
democracies. He talks specifically about how governments are prone to misperceive
information, or are overwhelmed by the abundance of information.54
Christopher Layne’s “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace” focuses
primarily on DPT’s causal logic, the externalization of shared democratic norms and
institutional constraints, and whether it can be a better predictor of international relations
outcomes than realism.55 Layne qualitatively tests the two competing explanations, DPT
and realism, through four different case studies of “near misses,” or crises where two
democratic states almost went to war with each other, but did not. The four case studies
are: the United States and Great Britain in 1861, the United States and Great Britain in
1895-96, France and Great Britain in 1898, and France and Germany in 1923.
According to Layne, “the selected case studies favor [DPT] because, in each, the
pacifying effect of democratic norms and culture was bolstered by complementary factors
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(e.g., economic interdependence, or special ties linking the disputants).”56 Each case
study is conducted through a process-tracing approach and identifies the factors to which
decision makers respond, how those factors influence decisions, the actual course of
events, and the possible effect of other variables on the outcome.57
Based on the study, Layne concludes that realism provides the stronger
explanation for why war was avoided in the case studies. On the externalization of
shared democratic norms, he states that each of the cases had at least one democratic state
ready to go to war based on vital strategic or reputation interests that were at stake. War
was only avoided because one side decided to pull back from the brink. The “live and let
live” spirit of peaceful dispute resolution, at the DPT core, did not hold up, Layne says.
It was realist factors that played the heaviest role.
On DPT’s institutional logic, Layne says that if public opinion is antiwar and it
really has an effect on decision making, then democracies would be peaceful with all
nations, democratic or not. He says, “[i]f citizens and policy makers of a democracy
were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should
be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the
adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same.”58 His study
claims that public opinion has also been an inhibitor of war, citing examples from the
turn of the 20th century. Domestic political structures, Layne says, cannot explain DPT
either, because checks and balances focuses on an independent variable, decisional
constraints embedded in a state’s domestic political structure, that is associated with, but
not exclusive to, democracies.
56
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In “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,” David Spiro argues that the absence
of wars between liberal democracies is not a significant pattern of the last 200 years. He
pays particular focus to Michael Doyle’s claim that no liberal democracy has ever fought
a war with another liberal democracy. He criticizes pro-DPT studies on the basis that
their analyses are “highly sensitive to the ways that they select definitions of the key
terms of democracy and war, and to the methods they choose for statistical analysis.”59
He also argues that a significant portion of the quantitative studies on democracy and war
has little to do with the theories they seek to corroborate, “and that the results rest on
methods and operationalization of variables that undergo contortions before they yield
apparently significant results.”60
The beginning of the article explores the liberal legacy of DPT and its main
literary contributors, as well as the different definitions that have been given to
“democracy” and “war.” The main section of the work is a probability analysis of dyadic
country pairings during the period of 1918-1980. It explores how random chance of wars
compares to quantitative studies that have proclaimed there to be “zero wars” between
democracies.
Spiro concludes that the statistics found in his study are in line with
Mearsheimer’s speculation that there have been few democracies over the last two
centuries, and as a result there have not been many cases where two democracies were in
a position to fight each other. He states that out of all the pro-DPT theorists, Rummel’s
claims on liberal theory are the strongest. Rummel tested the relationship between
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freedom and pacifism.61 Spiro recommends that future research give more attention to
why democracies have allied with one another. “The question for future research should
be whether the normative basis for liberal democracy leads regimes to join one another in
waging war on non-believers,” wrote Spiro.62 He also states that if representative
government is the reason for liberal alliances, then future research should take into
account difference in relative autonomy of liberal states.63
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Chapter 2: Background on the Turkish-Israeli Relationship
The Turkish-Israeli Relationship
The Turkey-Israel relationship is complicated, dynamic, and always changing.
This chapter will provide a brief, yet thorough, review of their relations, dating back to
1949. The chapter will be broken down into three sections, each reflecting a different
period of the relationship. The first section will discuss Turkish-Israeli ties from 19491968, known as the “Peripheral Alliance.” The second section will explore relations
from the mid-1980s through the early 2000s, known as the “1990s Alignment.” The third
and concluding section will explore the relationship from 2006 to the present.

1949-1968, “The Peripheral Alliance”
Turkey officially recognized Israel in 1949, an unthinkable move at the time for a
Muslim country. Early on, the two states had established diplomatic relations, but they
eroded when Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Searching for a more established
role in the Middle East, Turkey enhanced its alliances with the Baghdad Pact states, most
notably Iraq. This resulted in the regression of its relations with Israel, and was further
compounded by the 1956 Suez Canal War, which resulted in Turkey recalling its
ambassador to Israel. The Jewish state spent the next ten years attempting to mend
relations, with 1958 proving to be the turning point.1
In 1958 Turkey and Israel began what is commonly referred to as “The Peripheral
Alliance” or the “Phantom Pact.” Its foundations were laid by Israeli Prime Minister
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David Ben-Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. At the request of
Turkey the alliance was largely kept covert, in large part because of its fluctuating
relations with the Arab nations.2 Nonetheless, both countries had their own specific
reasons for wanting to re-kindle the relations that had begun in 1949, as well as some
overlapping ones.
In The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Partners,
Ofra Bengio credits Israel for the initiation and ongoing development of the alliance,
stating that it had three primary reasons for doing so. First, Israel wanted to break the
ring of isolation that the Arab states had placed on it by forming an alliance with the nonArab countries of the periphery. Second, it wanted to stabilize the region and form a new
balance of power. And third, it wanted to strengthen relations with the West, specifically
the United States, it helped that Turkey belonged to North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).3
Turkey’s reasons for developing the peripheral alliance resulted from a timeline
of circumstantial events that drastically altered their strategic thinking. Turkey was
furious with Iraq over its decision to vote against it on the issue of Cyprus at the United
Nations (UN) in December 1957.4 This came after Iraq had told Turkish officials that
they would not only vote in Turkey’s favor, but try to influence other Arab states to as
well. While the voting did not end up deciding Cyprus’ fate, it left a negative impression
on Turkish officials and public opinion.5 In February 1958 Turkey was put on alert by
the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a merging of Egypt and Syria.
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Cairo was already a longstanding rival of Ankara, and now technically became a border
country in the south.
The UAR also threatened to surround Turkey with pro-Soviet countries, and
Turkey was fearful that the UAR would try to keep expanding to include other Arab
states.6 Finally, in July 1958 the Iraqi monarchy fell, which initiated an immediate
change in Turkey’s outlook on the region and Israel. There was fear that a new regime in
Iraq would not honor the Baghdad Pact, which was largely held together by the personal
relationship of Turkey’s Menderes and Iraq’s leader Nuri al-Sa’id. Turkey was also wary
of the effects the Iraqi fall might have on its neighbors, possibly engulfing it with hostile
countries.
Israel and Turkey also had some shared concerns that helped bring them back
together. First and foremost, both were adamant about keeping Soviet expansion at bay.
Turkey was a NATO member and Israel was searching for closer relations with NATO.
Helping to halt Soviet influence in the region was in both of their interests.7 Both states
also wanted to contain pan-Arabism, which the Egyptian rival of both states, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, was quickly championing and expanding. Pan-Islamism was also a
concern for both states, in particular Turkey, whose entire state infrastructure was
centered on keeping the state secular. Terrorism was becoming a growing trend and both
countries sought the other’s cooperation in helping fight it. Lastly, both countries wanted
to improve their images in the West and creating an alliance was thought to help that
cause.8
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The Peripheral Alliance resulted in increased relations mainly in economic areas,
agriculture, and military cooperation. Israel helped train Turkish farmers to increase their
crop output and Turkey continually sent its own officials to Israel to learn the most
advanced agricultural processes the world had to offer. By early 1965 bilateral trade
between the two reached $30,000,000.9 Areas of economic cooperation included joint
research projects, joint industrial projects, and tourism. Israeli experts also helped in the
planning of the Turkish Keban dam.10
Military cooperation was the heart of the alliance, and at the time it was Israel’s
only military agreement with another country. Regular meetings between high-level
military intelligence officials were held every six months. These included the exchange
of intelligence and information, coordination and cooperation on various military issues,
exchange of know-how in the field of military industry, joint enterprise to manufacture
mortars for Germany, training in various areas of military expertise, and the use of each
other’s airspace.

11

Beginning in 1958, the Peripheral Alliance lasted eight years, but its erosion
began in 1964 over an issue in Cyprus. Conflict between Cyprus’ Turkish and Greek
residents was flaring up and the issue of how to split up the land was brought to the UN.
While the vote on what to do was never fully accomplished, Israel had abstained much to
the anger of Turkey.12 Following this, Turkey began shifting its foreign policy toward the
Arab states, at the expense of Israel. From 1966 onward official relations began to enter
a deep freeze, with no signs of improvement. Following the 1967 Six-Day War and the
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Palestinian refugee issue that ensued, Turkish-Israeli relations were more or less publicly
neutralized and Turkey became even more aligned with the Arab states. However, very
low-level, unofficial relations continued as Turkey still allowed Israeli Air Force flights
to cross its airspace, and Turkey accepted Israel’s humanitarian aid following an
earthquake in 1967.
Overall, the Peripheral Alliance was largely at the whim of Turkey’s strategic
needs. When those strategies called for change, they did not necessarily include Israel in
the plan, and thus the relationship cooled. Israel never got the public acknowledgement it
was looking for in order to boost its image and credibility in the Middle East, though it
would spend the next 30 years attempting to restore ties.

The 1990s Alignment
Secret military relations between Israel and Turkey started back up in the mid1980s. In 1991, the two officially upgraded relations to embassy status and in 1996 they
signed a formal agreement.13 Unlike the Peripheral Alliance, the 1990s alignment was a
joint public-project, in which the two partners contributed equally to its formation and
success. As is always the case with alliances, both Turkey and Israel had their individual
reasons for wanting to jump start their relationship, as well as a few overlapping
motivations.
For Turkey, the international setting had changed drastically since the Peripheral
Alliance. In general, international attitudes towards Israel had changed. Egypt had a full
peace treaty with the Jewish state. Turkey’s main rivals in the region, Greece and the
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Soviet Union, had established full diplomatic relations with Israel, setting a precedent for
other states. The fact that the Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanians were also engaged in
peace talks with Israel also secured legitimacy for Turkey upgrading ties. 14 An IsraeliSyrian agreement had significant implications for Ankara, as Turkey believed it might
lose important strategic leverage over Damascus should Syria make peace with Israel
before the Turks did. Coincidentally, for some time Turkish officials discouraged Israel
from making peace with Syria.15
While regional issues created the environment for Turkish interest in Israel, it was
the military that was the driving force behind the rapprochement. Conflict with the
minority Kurdish population began in 1984, and the Turkish military was very interested
in learning all it could from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Israel possessed immense
training skills from real life experience, as it had fought several wars over since its
inception. It also had sophisticated weaponry and an abundance of technological knowhow.16 The Turkish military also began to see Israel as a natural ally based on its
secularism and pro-Western leanings. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey felt it
had to re-establish its importance to the West, and in proportion it was more rebuffed by
Europe, so it sought closer ties to the US. Israel proved a valuable player in that
respect.17
Israel had been amenable to rapprochement with Turkey for some time. While
there was some domestic political debate about whether it could negatively impact the
peace process with the Arab states, it was generally accepted that ties with Turkey would
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be a positive step forward.18 The shared Turkish-Israeli concern over the regional
balance was Israel’s main motivation. Following the Gulf War, Israel felt it needed
strategic relations with Turkey to help balance the three radical countries in the Middle
East: Syria, Iraq, and Iran.19 This was particularly important if peace talks with Syria
failed. Further, Israel felt that should it lose land in negotiations with the Palestinians and
Syria, Turkey could offer strategic depth.20
Just as it had in the 1950s, Israel also desired Turkey’s help in reaching out to
Muslim states, as well as Central Asia, in order to increase bilateral trade and to moderate
anti-Islamic forums.21 Not only would this help Israel’s global credibility, it could bring
countries into its orbit that might otherwise fall into that of Iran’s.
The 1996 formal agreement substantially increased and legitimized the IsraelTurkey alignment, and in particular their military cooperation. Several high-ranking
officials began making regular visits to both countries and in 1998 Turkey decided to
increase its number of military attachés from one to three. This made Israel the fourth
country after the United States, Germany, and France to receive three vs. the regular one
Turkey usually sent.22 In the latter part of the 1990s Israel and Turkey would sign several
more agreements increasing military cooperation in training, airspace, and intelligence
issues, among other things. The two also began conducting arms deals, which between
1996 and 1998 were valued at $700 million. This represented the biggest-ever foreign
contract for Israel’s aircraft industry.23 In 2001, American, Israeli, and Turkish air forces
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held joint air maneuvers over Konya, Turkey, the first of any kind between Israel and
Turkey. These arms purchases and maneuvers became more extensive and frequent in
the early 2000s.24
The two also substantially increased economic trade, and agricultural, industrial,
scientific, and cultural cooperation. The two agreed to a free trade zone, a treaty to
prevent double taxation, and an agreement for mutual encouragement and protection of
investment. By 2010 bilateral trade reached $3.5 billion.25 As arms trades started
picking up in the early 2000s, so did Israeli purchases of Turkish water and the means to
transport it. Both sides contributed to people-to people interactions to promote cultural
exchange as each hosted the other’s museum exhibitions, bands, concerts, and students.26
Overall, the 1990s and early 2000s were a period of prosperity in the IsraelTurkey relationship. A major testament to the strength and development of the
relationship was that it was largely unaffected by the second intifada, which was a five
year period of significantly increased violence between the Palestinians and Israelis.
However, in 2006 the nature of the relationship began to noticeably change, mostly as a
result of the changes wrought by the conservative Islamist Justice and Development
(AKP) party.

Turkish-Israeli Relations from 2006-Present
In 2002 the AKP was elected as the majority party in Turkey. With its
conservative and Islamist ideals, many anticipated that it would change the policy on
24
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Turkish-Israeli relations. However, in the beginning relations with Israel remained
fruitful, both materially and diplomatically. One reason was that the AKP sought to
prove European skeptics wrong about its sincerity in building a new type of Islamic state,
one which adhered to the principles of Western democracy.27 This was crucial to
Turkey’s desire to be admitted to the European Union. Second, the AKP’s openness to
Israel may have been a result of wanting to avoid additional friction with Turkey’s
military establishment, which was already suspicious of their intentions.28
In 2006, however, the first step in the current diplomatic downswing occurred
when the AKP began engaging the ruling party in the Gaza Strip, Hamas. Israel formally
recognizes Hamas as a terrorist organization and the two refuse to negotiate directly with
each other. The AKP invited senior Hamas official Khalid Maashal, who was residing in
Damascus, to visit Ankara.
Turkish engagement of Hamas signified several changes in Turkey: 1) Turkey’s
ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties and movements had grown stronger and now posed a
threat to relations with Israel; 2) the Turkish military elite, who were largely responsible
for the close ties with Israel, had lost much of their political influence and ability to
dictate foreign policy; 3) the 2003 US- Iraq war had brought a deterioration in Ankara’s
relations with Washington, resulting in a negative perception of Israel’s role in the
region; 4) Turkey’s closer relations with Syria, had altered the balance of power in the
region and decreased the need for relations with Israel; 5) for the AKP party, Iran was
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being seen as much less a threat than before; 6) Israel’s handling of the Palestinian
situation was creating significant resentment among Turkish politicians and the public.29
Bengio also notes that under the AKP government anti-Semitism has largely been
unaddressed and even indirectly incited, “where as Germany and other stated forbid the
publication of Mein Kampf, the Turkish government did not do so on the flimsy pretext
of protecting democracy.”30 Nonetheless, even after the controversial visit by Maashal
trade between Turkey and Israel remained prosperous, as did tourism.
In 2008, Turkey tried to broker a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. Turkey
was becoming increasingly closer with Syria and was using Syrian-Israel feud to further
establish itself as a regional power. However, it would prove unsuccessful, largely as a
result of the 2009 war in Gaza.
In the weeks leading up to the Gaza war, Turkey was trying hard to get Israel and
Syria to the negotiating table. Right before the Gaza war began, the then Israeli Prime
Minister, Ehud Olmert, made a visit to Turkey. While there he made no mention of
Israel’s intentions to attack Gaza in an attempt to weaken Hamas and its rocket cache.
The war resulted in Assad protesting against Israel and pulling out of pre-negotiations for
a peace treaty, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan was severely insulted.31
Feeling betrayed Erodgan led the way in criticizing Israel, stating that history
would judge them for the black stain they were leaving on humanity. He even called
Israel’s actions “a crime against humanity,” and demanded that Israel be expelled from
the United Nations for ignoring the organization’s call to stop the conflict in Gaza. He
then famously stormed out of a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos
29

Ibid, 177.
Ibid, 178.
31
Ibid, 183.
30

37

economic forum. While Turkey had no intention of cutting off relations with Israel, as
was obvious when it acted as the mediator in the Gaza war, Turkey’s tilt away from Israel
became more obvious.32
The next two major events in Turkish-Israel relations were those that that are the
focus of this case study. First, in May 2010, a Turkish flotilla of ships carrying anti-Gaza
blockade protestors tried to break the blockade, but was met by Israeli commandos. The
confrontation resulted in the deaths of eight Turkish nationals. Second, the UN Palmer
report, which was an investigation into the flotilla incident which found that Israel had
used excessive force, but the blockade of Gaza was legal under international law.
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Chapter 3- The Case Study
In trying to understand the applicability of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) on
small powers, I will employ a case study exploring two related events involving Israel
and Turkey which could have potentially brought them to a physical conflict. The first is
the Flotilla incident in which a number of humanitarian ships attempted to break the
Israeli blockade of Gaza, resulting in the death of eight Turkish nationals. The second is
the release of the UN Palmer Report, which was an investigation of the Flotilla incident,
and a series of recommendations that condemned the attack on the ships but deemed the
Israeli blockade legal. To provide proper context the chapter will begin with a review of
the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip. It will followed by a recounting of the Flotilla
incident and UN Palmer Report.

The Israeli Blockade
In 2005 Israel withdrew all forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip, but kept
control of its borders. In 2006 Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by
Israel, the United States, and the European Union, won the Palestinian legislative
elections and took control of Gaza following a bloody conflict with their political rival,
Fatah. In 2007 Israel responded to the Hamas takeover by imposing a strict blockade of
Gaza, which still seriously impedes any persons and goods from entering or leaving the
territory.1 Israel only allows items into Gaza that it labels as “humanitarian.” According
to Israeli officials, the blockade was established so that illegal weapons and equipment
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used for rockets could not enter and be used against Israel. Between 2005 and 2008 over
4,000 rockets were fired into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip.2
There is international debate about whether Israel does allow sufficient
humanitarian aid into Gaza. To corroborate its claim Israel issues a detailed Weekly
Summary of the Humanitarian Aid Transferred into Gaza. However, the UN office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid regularly issues reports on the situation stating that
the blockade has made conditions worse for Palestinians by creating increased poverty,
increased unemployment, and decreased economic activity. They also state that the
blockade has made reconstruction from the 2009 Israeli invasion of Gaza all but
impossible.3 The blockade has resulted in increased animosity towards Israel by several
humanitarian NGOs and countries around the world.

The Turkish Flotilla Incident
On May 22, 2010, the MV Mavi Marmara, a former Turkish passenger ferry
owned by the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
(IHH), departed Istanbul in an attempt to break the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. On its
way it stopped at the Mediterranean port of Antalya to pick up more than 500 passengers,
and then met up at sea with five other ships, including several from the Free Gaza
Movement. The six-ship flotilla then attempted to make its way to the Gaza Strip with
the stated intention of delivering 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, while at the same time
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making a symbolic event out of breaking the Israeli blockade. In total, there were about
700 activists from 28 countries onboard the ships, including 11 Americans and some
European parliamentarians.4
On May 30th the flotilla received an offer from Israel requesting that it dock at the
Israeli port of Ashdod so that the cargo could be inspected before delivery. Under Israeli
protocol, shipments of any kind to Gaza are inspected by Israeli authorities accompanied
by representatives of the sending NGO. This is done to halt weapons smuggling to
Hamas. The Flotilla refused the request.5
On May 31st the flotilla was intercepted by Israeli navy zodiac boats in
international waters between 80-100 miles off the Israeli coast. Commandos took control
of five of the six boats with ease. However, the Mavi Marmara resisted. When the
commandos dropped in from helicopters, they were confronted by the passengers and
activists wielding iron rods, knives, broken glass bottles, and slingshots. They were also
equipped with gas masks, night vision goggles, and life vests. The commandos were
carrying both paintball guns and live firearms. While it is unclear how the confrontation
began, it resulted in the death of eight Turkish nationals and an American citizen, and
injuries to 24 other passengers and ten Israeli commandos.
Following the clash, the flotilla of ships was taken to Ashdod. The passengers
were detained and the cargo was removed, inspected, and trucked to the Kerem Shalom
border crossing between Israel and Gaza. Israeli officials said that they found Molotov
cocktails, detonators, wood and metal clubs, slingshots and rocks, large hammers, and
sharp metal objects on the Marmara. Meanwhile, the passengers denied having started
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the conflict or having acted in an offensive manner. Hamas refused to allow the aid to be
transferred into Gaza and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stored it at a military base
while it consulted international organizations. By June 3rd all the detainees who were not
severely injured had been deported. On June 15th, it was announced that the UN would
distribute the aid.6
Tensions between Turkey and Israel were already high before the Flotilla
incident. In 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan was furious with Israel over its
invasion of Gaza. He felt personally slighted when then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert was in Turkey days before the invasion began, and did not let Erdogan know of
Israel’s intentions. In anger Erdogan cancelled a joint Turkish-Israeli war game and got
into a very public feud with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos Economic
Forum.
The Flotilla was seen by Turks as a blatant act of unnecessary Israeli aggression,
and led to a spillover of already pent up emotions. Almost immediately following reports
that Turks on the Mavi Marmara had been killed, the streets of Istanbul filled with a
reported 10,000 people screaming various anti-Israel and anti-Semitic slogans, including
“death to Israel.”7 Turkish security forces had to stop one crowd from storming the
Israeli consulate.8 Similar protests also occurred in Ankara and other areas of Turkey, as
well as around the Muslim world and in Europe.
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Turkey immediately cancelled three future military exercises with Israel and
recalled its ambassador to the Jewish state. These moves were internationally
acknowledged as a dangerous and rapid erosion of relations. Bulent Yildirim, chairman
of the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH),
stated during the protests that he had received one million applications from volunteers
wanting to take part in future flotillas.9 If Turkey was so outraged over this one Flotilla
incident, and had downgraded diplomatic ties over it, what would the fallout be like if
flotillas became a regular occurrence? Israel made clear that it would not hesitate to act
in similar fashion against future attempts. Adding to the tension, Israel stated that there
was evidence that Turkish officials were indirectly involved in planning and facilitating
the Flotilla.
Since its inception as the ruling party in 2002, the AKP Party has continually
battled with the opposition secular parties. But following the Flotilla incident Devlet
Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, one of the AKP’s main rivals,
stated that “the detailed basics of the political, legal, diplomatic and, if necessary,
military responses to this should be determined. The harshest response should be given
immediately without making the process material for domestic politics along the lines of
being pro or anti-Israel.”10
Prime Minister Erdogan stated that Israel would face “unprecedented and
incalculable reprisals” for its actions.11 He also said that “Israel in no way can legitimize
9
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this murder, it cannot wash its hands of this blood.”12 According to Israeli officials, this
comment raised serious concerns about the reports coming out of Ankara that it might be
willing to send navy ships to escort future flotillas. “This is a definite possibility that we
need to prepare for,” a senior Israeli defense official said.13 If Turkey followed through
on its threats, physical conflict was all but assured as Israel continually emphasized that it
would enforce the blockade at all costs and would not apologize for its use of force. This
sentiment was shared by the military and the Israeli Supreme Court.
Israel clearly took the threat from Turkey seriously as the government issued a
travel warning for all Israelis planning to go to Turkey and asking that all Israelis already
in Turkey return to Israel. Increasing the tension even more, Israel announced on June 3,
2010 that it would conduct a 10-day joint exercise between the Israeli and Greek air
forces.14 Greece has been in a decade’s long dispute with Turkey over the status of land
in Cyprus. Israel and Turkey appeared to be heading down a dangerous road that could
have conceivably led to an armed conflict.

The United Nations Palmer Report
On August 2, 2010, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon established a
Panel of Inquiry to explore the events of the Flotilla incident. It became internationally
known as “the Palmer Report,” (“the Report”). The Report was convened by Sir
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Geoffrey Palmer, Colombian President Àlvaro Uribe, Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar of
Israel, and Mr. Suleyman Ozdem Sanberk of Turkey, and included national findings by
both Turkish and Israeli investigations. Upon review of the national findings, and some
additional independent investigation, the UN panel was tasked with making
recommendations concerning how to avoid similar incidents in the future. The report
was not meant to adjudicate any legal liability or responsibilities on the part of either
country.15

The Report of Turkish National Commission of Inquiry
The Turkish National Commission of Inquiry (the “Commission”) began its report
by noting that Israel’s naval blockade is an “illegal” form of economic and political
warfare, which also created restrictions on ordinary consumer items that served no
security purpose. The Commission claimed that this has had a disproportionate and
punitive impact on the civilian population, and has increased the severity of the
humanitarian crisis going on in Gaza.16
The Commission gave several reasons why the Israeli blockade is illegal under
international law. First, “a blockade may only be imposed in a situation of international
armed conflict and the State of Israel has never recognized Palestine as a State or its
armed conflict with Hamas as an international one.”17 Second, “it did not comply with
customary international law requirements regarding notification and enforcement set out
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in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.”18
Moreover “Israel did not adequately notify the ‘duration and extent’ of the blockade. No
list of the goods that were prohibited has been made publicly available and no end date
has been specified; and the blockade was not consistently enforced.”19 Third, the
blockade is disproportional under the laws of the San Remo Manual. Fourth, the
blockade is a form of collective punishment, illegal under Article 33 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Fifth, Israel is an occupying power in Gaza, and as such cannot
blockade the borders.20
The Commission’s findings on the actual Flotilla were that all those aboard were
civilians, including politicians, academics, journalists, and religious leaders. The ships
were only carrying humanitarian supplies; no guns or other weapons were found to be on
board, and thus the ship could not be attacked under international humanitarian law. All
passengers and baggage were thoroughly screened prior to boarding, and the ports that
the ships departed from were certified under the International Maritime Organization
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.21 Moreover, the Turkish government
claimed that there was a diplomatic understanding with Israel that the vessels in the
flotilla would not force a breach of the blockade but rather would alter their course of
destination to the port of Al-Arish if necessary, and that Israel would not use force.
On the issue of the actual boarding of the ships by the IDF, the Turkish
Commission concluded that it was illegal under international law because the flotilla was
18
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still in international waters. Specifically, it stated that under the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a foreign flagged vessel
may not be boarded on the high seas without the consent of the flag State. In regards to
the controversy over the Mavi Marmara passengers attacking IDF soldiers, the
Commission stated that the passengers were panicked and acted in self-defense to prevent
the IDF soldiers from boarding the vessels.
The Commission claimed that it used excessive force both before and after the
boarding, and that there was indiscriminate shooting, including from the helicopter that
was in the vicinity. It accused IDF soldiers of targeted attacks on individuals who did not
represent a threat and claimed that attacks by the IDF continued even after attempts by
the passengers to surrender.22 Finally, the Commission stated that Israel has a duty to
make reparations for the accused violations of international law, including to the families
of those killed, and to issue a formal apology to Turkey. 23

The Israeli Commission’s Report
Unlike the Turkish commission, the Israeli Commission’s report (the
“Commission”) noted that the blockade of the Gaza Strip is legal under international law.
Since the beginning of 2001, thousands of rockets and mortars have been fired into Israel
from Gaza. Because of this, Israel has been engaged in an armed conflict with
Palestinian terrorist organizations, and the normative framework to be applied to the
activities of the IDF are the principles and rules of the law of armed conflict.24 Thus, the
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blockade is justified based on the need to prevent weapons, terrorists, and money from
entering or exiting the Gaza Strip.
The Commission also stated that the blockade meets all customary international
law requirements for the use of a blockade, including the requirements of notification,
effectiveness and enforcement. This reasoning relied on the 1909 London Declaration,
the San Remo Manual, military manuals, and other various commentaries.25 The
Commission also stated that Israel was complying with its humanitarian obligations,
including the prohibition on starving the civilian population or preventing the supply of
essential objects needed for a civilian population’s survival. This reasoning was also
based on paragraphs 102-104 of the San Remo Manual, the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions26, military manuals, and other commentaries.27 On
the accusation of collective punishment, the Commission stated that there is no evidence
of deliberative restrictions imposed on bringing goods into Gaza with the sole or main
purpose of denying the civilian population.28
The Commission stated that it engaged in several diplomatic initiatives with
Turkey and other countries to halt the departure of the Flotilla. But these initiatives were
either ignored or rejected.29 On the Flotilla itself, the Commission explained that its
purpose was to bring publicity to the humanitarian situation in Gaza by attempting to
breach the blockade. It said that the Flotilla was largely led by IHH, described as a
25
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“humanitarian organization with a radical-Islamic orientation” which provides support to
anti-Western and radical groups including Hamas.30 The Commission stated that the
majority participating in the flotilla were peace activists, but that there was a “hardcore
group” of about 40 IHH activists on the Mavi Marmara who boarded separately in
Istanbul and without any security checks. The “hardcore” group had made it known who
they were during the voyage, and had made preparations to resist any boarding attempt
by IDF personnel.
Interestingly, the Commission stated that only three of the six flotilla vessels
contained humanitarian supplies. Further, weapons and combat equipment were found
on board the Mavi Marmara, including flares, rods, axes, knives, tear gas, gas masks,
protective vests, and night-vision goggles. No firearms were found, but the Commission
expressed that it was not convinced that pre-boarding security measures for the Flotilla
had ensured no firearms were brought aboard.
On the actual boarding of the Mavi Marmara, the Commission explained that the
first attempt by speed boat was met with resistance and failed. Once IDF commandos did
manage to board, violence against the soldiers was carried out in an organized fashion by
a group of passengers armed with weapons, including firearms. Suggestions that the
passengers were acting in legitimate self-defense were not corroborated by the evidence,
said the Commission.

Palmer Report Findings and Recommendations
The Palmer Report considered both the Turkey and Israeli reports and found the
naval blockade of Gaza to be legal under international law:
30
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The Israeli report to the Panel makes it clear that the naval
blockade as a measure of the use of force was adopted for
the purpose of defending its territory and population, and
the Panel accepts that was the case…Hamas is the de facto
political and administrative authority in Gaza and to a large
extent has control over events on the ground there. It is
Hamas that is firing the projectiles into Israel or is
permitting others to do so. The Panel considers the conflict
should be treated as an international one for the purposes of
the law of blockade…The law does not operate in a
political vacuum and it is implausible to deny that the
nature of the armed violence between Israel and Hamas
goes beyond purely domestic matters.31
Further, the Report stated that Israel had complied with the rules of effectiveness and
notification in regards to establishing a blockade.
The Report expressed that Israel had the right to enforce its blockade, and that
such enforcement may take place on the high seas. It concluded that it was reasonable
for the Israeli Navy to believe the vessels of the Flotilla were going to proceed to Gaza.
They had ignored and openly resisted calls to re-direct to the Port of Ashdod or Al-Arish.
What it also found, however, was that the Navy did not need to board the vessels before
sunrise, as the ship was still 64 nautical miles outside the blockade zone and would not
have reached it until after sunrise. Boarding in the dark only complicated the situation.
The Report also stated that Israel did not make a real-time attempt to provide immediate
warning to the vessels that IDF commandos would be boarding, and did take them by
surprise in that sense. However, it conceded that the vessels were aware of the IDF
presence shadowing them.32
Before boarding the vessels, IDF commandos launched stun and smoke grenades
in order to halt any resistance by passengers. Israeli reports confirm that beanbag and
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paintball guns were also used. The Report said that the manner and environment of the
boarding was excessive and that less violent means should have been considered and
executed. On the force used once aboard the Mavi Marmara, the Report concluded that
there was organized, pre-meditated resistance requiring the IDF commandos to use force
for their own protection. It also stated, however, that the loss of life and injuries resulting
from the used force was “unacceptable.”33
The Report made a series of recommendations regarding how to avoid similar
incidents in the future. It suggested that Israel try its best to ease the restrictions on Gaza,
that it constantly review the necessity of its blockade, that force should be used
cautiously and as a last resort, that all humanitarian missions to Gaza go through the
established procedures Israel had created, and that states aware of their citizens’ attempts
to try and break any naval blockade proactively warn them of the risks involved and try
to dissuade them from doing so. The Report suggested that Israel offer an “appropriate
statement of regret” about what happened and that it pay reasonable reparations for the
deceased and injured, which would be administered by the two governments through a
joint trust fund. Finally, it encouraged Israel and Turkey to re-establish full diplomatic
relations for the sake of Middle East stability and peace.34
The fallout between Israel and Turkey as a result of the Palmer Report was even
worse than after the actual Flotilla incident. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan was
outraged, stating that he would ignore the Report’s findings and still see the blockade as
illegal. In response, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and other high-level Israeli
diplomats, and severed all military ties with the Jewish state. A US State Department
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cable released by Wikileaks reported that upon her expulsion, Israeli Ambassador Gaby
Levy stated, “[h]e (Erdogan) hates us…he hates us religiously and his hatred is
spreading.”35
Further, Prime Minister Erdogan officially announced that Turkish warships
would escort new flotillas to Gaza. Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy asked, “what if the Israelis decide to stop the next Turkish navy-escorted
flotilla as they stopped the Turkish-backed flotilla in 2010? Will the Turkish navy ships
choose to react? As chilling as this scenario sounds, it is not unlikely. If the two
countries fail to slow the escalating situation, they could well find themselves in
conflict.”36
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said, "the time has come for Israel to pay for
its stance that sees it above international laws and disregards human conscience… the
first and foremost result is that Israel is going to be devoid of Turkey's friendship … as
long as the Israeli government does not take the necessary steps, there will be no turning
back."37 Even though Israel’s initial fears after the Flotilla incident were now being made
official by Turkey’s highest authorities, the government remained steadfast. It refused to
apologize for the Flotilla incident, and it maintained that it would continue to enforce the
Gaza blockade, now under the justification of the Palmer Report.
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Speaking to American television personality Charlie Rose, Erdogan stated that
“the killing of nine people is in fact a cause of war…that could be done if necessary.”38
He also stated that Turkey would increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean, a very
serious provocation which put the Israeli military on high alert. Israel saw this as a direct
threat to its own resources as there was Turkish animosity towards Israel’s agreement
with Cyprus on an energy sharing deal. Further, Israel had recently discovered a major
gasoline field off its coast, and viewed Turkey’s proclamations as a direct threat to its
sovereignty over the area. In response to the threat, Israeli Energy Minister Uzi Landau
stated that Israel would support and defend its rigs if necessary.
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Chapter 4- Democratic Peace Theory & the Case Study
Since Turkey and Israel are democracies, Democratic Peace Theory (DPT)
proposes that institutional and normative constraints would play a primary role in
preventing the two countries from engaging in physical conflict. This chapter will
explore the circumstances of the Flotilla incident and the release of the United Nations
(UN) Palmer Report (“the Report”) to determine whether the accepted DPT causal logic
played a role in halting a physical engagement. Institutional constraints will be explored
first and will specifically focus on public opinion, legislative bureaucracies, and
autonomous institutions. The second section will explore normative constraints,
specifically shared democratic norms and mutual trust.

Institutional Constraints
DPT’s institutional constraint logic states that democracies do not go to war or
escalate conflicts with each other because of constraints placed upon them by the public,
legislative bureaucracies and other autonomous entities within the country. Maoz and
Russett state:
International action in a democratic political system
requires the mobilization of both general public opinion
and of a variety of institutions that make up the system of
government, such as the legislature, the political
bureaucracies and key interest groups. This implies that
very few goals could be presented to justify fighting wars
in democracies.1
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It is important to note that when exploring public constraint, three specific questions need
to be addressed: is the public pacific as DPT claims? Did the public constrain the
government? And, did the public hold the government accountable for its policies or
actions that could have led to physical conflict?

Flotilla Incident- Turkey
The AKP Party openly supported the efforts of the Foundation for Human Rights
and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) to help Gaza. While their direct
involvement in helping the Flotilla is disputed, there has been evidence found on laptops
confiscated by Israel following the docking of the ships in Ashdod, suggesting that
Turkish officials helped organize it. The Turkish public, however, showed no signs of
concern that their government may have helped facilitate putting citizens in the line of
fire. There was also very limited criticism from the Turkish public of Prime Minister
Erdogan’s and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s aggressive rhetoric and threats
towards Israel.
Following the Flotilla incident Istanbul’s Taksim Square was flooded with a
reported ten thousand protestors showing their support for the victims of the Flotilla
incident and for future flotilla attempts, as well as their animosity towards the Israeli
blockade of Gaza.2 Turkish police were forced to block dozens of stone-throwing
protestors who tried to storm the Israel Consulate in Istanbul. Similar protests were also
conducted in Ankara. Bulent Yildirim, chairman of the IHH, proclaimed that he had
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received over one million requests by individuals that wanted to join future flotillas.3
Further, no anti-AKP or anti-flotilla rallies seemed to have occurred in Turkey at the
time. With all of this, DPT’s claim that the public is pacific does not hold. The Turkish
public acknowledged the dangerous repercussions of the flotilla movement, being
attacked by Israeli navy boats, but supported the government and the movement
nonetheless. This also makes the question of whether the public constrained the
government moot, it clearly did not.
Since the public supported the government’s actions and the flotilla movement,
there was nothing for the public to hold the government accountable for. Thus, DPT’s
assumption that governments which produce policies that put citizens in harm’s way will
likely not get re-elected does not apply. Prime Minister Erdogan and his AKP party were
re-elected in June 2011, with a whopping 50 percent of the vote, up four points from the
last election.4
DPT also states that competing legislative bureaucracies and independent
institutions place a multitude of constraints on a government’s ability to wage war.5
Following the Flotilla incident there was near universal Turkish political outrage against
Israel.6 Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, one of the AKP’s
main rival parties, stated that he could not wait to see how Prime Minister Erdogan would
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back up his indirect threats towards Israel. He also suggested that war might be
necessary.7
Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy has been considerably influenced by the
military. While the AKP party has significantly reduced the military’s autonomy and
control over foreign policy, it is still the most influential and powerful institution in
Turkey outside of the government. Israeli-Turkish relations flourished in the 1990s and
early 2000s largely because Israel played a central role in the development and
modernization of the Turkish military. Israeli intelligence has also been important in the
Turkish fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey is also a member of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is led by the United States,
Israel’s staunchest ally. No Turkish institution has more to lose from an armed conflict
with Israel than the military.
However, the military appeared to have no discernible objections to the Flotilla
itself or the government’s response to Israel. Military officials made no public
complaints when three planned military exercises with Israel were cancelled or when the
Turkish ambassador to Israel was recalled.8 As can be seen, the theory that legislative
bureaucracies and autonomous institutions constrain the government’s ability to engage
in war does not apply to Turkey in the case of the Flotilla incident.

Flotilla Incident- Israel
Israel also faced protests following the Flotilla incident, though there are varying
reports about the number of protestors. The general estimate of those who took to the
7
8

“Israel’s attack blatant hostility toward Turkish nation, Bahceli says,” Accessed Apr. 16, 2012.
“Turkey recalls Israeli ambassador, cancels exercises,” CNN, May 31, 2010, Accessed Apr. 16, 2012,
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/31/turkey-recalls-israeli-ambassador-cancels-exercises/.

57

streets is put around 6,000-8,000. Unlike Turkey, however, the protestors were divided,
with several thousand protesting both against Turkish provocations and against Israel’s
handling of the incident.9 Most reports state that there were more critics of the Israeli
government on the streets than there were supporters. Those critical of Israel’s handling
marched through Tel Aviv’s central hub, Rabin Square, and towards the Tel Aviv defense
compound. Those protesting in support of the Israeli government’s actions massed in
front of the Turkish embassy. Both sides even went so far as to file petitions to the
Supreme Court in support of their various causes. However, all were rejected by the
Court.10
While government critics may have been more numerous than their counterparts
on the streets, public opinion polls suggest that, in general, Israelis were quite supportive
of their government’s actions. A well-known Middle Eastern public opinion center,
Pecther Middle East Polls, released data from a nationally representative telephone
survey of 500 Israeli Jews conducted June 7, 2010. Of those polled, 45.5 percent said
that the Israeli navy used the correct amount of force in commandeering the ships.
Thirty-nine percent said not enough force was used and only 7.6 percent said too much
force was used.
To the question of whether Israel should open Gaza to international humanitarian
shipments only 9.2 percent said they strongly felt it should be opened up. Fifty-eight
percent said they felt strongly that it should not. Further, on the question of how to
handle a flotilla if Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan came along as well as Turkish naval

9

Dahlia Scheindlin, “Israelis speak up,” Foreign Policy, Jun. 10, 2010, Accessed Apr. 20, 2012,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/10/israelis_speak_up.
10
“Court dismisses flotilla petitions,” The Jerusalem Post, Jun. 4, 2010, Accessed Apr. 20, 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177365.

58

vessels, 68 percent said that they strongly agreed that Israel should do whatever it takes to
stop it. Only 14 percent said that they either strongly or somewhat believed he should
quietly be let in, 7 percent for each “strongly” and “somewhat.” When asked about
Iranian ships trying to break the blockade those who believed strongly anything should be
done to stop them jumped to 77 percent.11
On June 9, 2010, Israeli market research institute New Wave Research conducted
a poll of 561 adult Israeli Jews on their thoughts about the Flotilla incident for an Israeli
publication, Yisrael Hayom. Ninety-two percent of those surveyed said they believed that
the Flotilla should have been stopped. Ninety-one percent said that future flotillas should
also be halted. Seventy-three percent said the blockade of Gaza should not be lifted.
Seventy-eight percent stated that they viewed Turkey as an enemy state.12 This data,
along with the fact that there were pro-government protests, suggests that the public was
not pacific, as DPT claims. This renders the question of whether they constrained the
Israeli government’s ability to go to war and whether they held the government
accountable moot.
Christopher Layne and Sebastian Rosato also provide an intriguing theory about a
public’s ability to constrain its government from engaging in conflict. Layne’s general
argument is “[i]f citizens and policy makers of a democracy were especially sensitive to
the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their
state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives
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lost and money spent will be the same.”13 Corroborating this suggestion, Rosato provides
a convincing assertion that “democratic leaders are as likely to lead as to follow public
opinion...Any call to defend or spread ‘our way of life,’ for example, is likely to have a
strong resonance in democratic polities…”14 Throughout history Israeli leaders have
consistently proven that they are willing to lead, or go to war, without consulting public
opinion. In 1956 Israel joined a coalition with the U.K. and France and attacked Egypt
in order to put the Suez Canal back in Western control. In 1967 Israel preemptively
attacked Egypt and took control of the Sinai Peninsula. In 1973, Israel was caught off
guard and took heavy casualties. Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan both resigned under heavy public pressure.15 Nonetheless, Israel invaded
Southern Lebanon only five years later in 1978, and again in 1982.
The 1982 invasion was particularly unpopular war in Israel, but the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) did not fully withdraw from the territory until 2000. In 2006, Israel fought
a war with Hezbollah, a recognized terrorist group based out of Lebanon, and was largely
seen to have made serious strategic errors costing it heavier casualties than first
anticipated. Public pressure forced then Chief of Staff Dan Halutz to resign and played a
role in Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s resignation in 2007. Nonetheless, Israel carried out
another full-scale invasion of Gaza in 2009. Since its formation, Israel has acted without
consulting the public. In any event, the Israeli public largely agreed with government
action in the case of the Flotilla, so the question of whether the public held the
government accountable is irrelevant.
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The Israeli parliament is one of the most unstable in the world. The way the
electoral system is set up governments are built on vulnerable coalitions, which many of
the parties included have highly competing interests. Of the four prime ministers that
served from 1996-2009, none completed their term, and three of them either resigned or
called early elections for political reasons (Ariel Sharon was incapacitated after he had a
stroke). The Kadima party won the 2009 election, but because party leader Tzipi Livni
was unable to put together a working coalition government she was forced to allow the
opposition Likud party to put one together with its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, as its
head. Even with all the inter-governmental tensions, instability, and infighting, criticism
was minimal after the Flotilla incident. The only outspoken governmental dissident of
Israel’s actions was Hanin Zoabi, an MK in the Arab Balad party who was a passenger on
the Mavi Maramara. Balad is a minority party and not in the coalition, its power and
influence is minimal. Legislative constraints did not exist, as the leading coalition had
near universal support for its actions and policies.
The Israeli Supreme Court sided with the government and IDF on all matters
related to the Flotilla. This is significant as the Court has gained a reputation in the world
of jurisprudence for being particularly independent. Its show of support in the Flotilla
incident is outside the norm, as it has regularly ruled against government and IDF actions
and decisions. In March 2000 it ruled that Arabs could settle on Jewish National Fund
lands. In January 2003 it overturned a decision by the Central Election Commission to
disqualify the Balad Party and its then leader, Ahmed Tibi, who had been a long-time
adviser to Yasser Arafat. The court has consistently ordered the re-routing of the West
Bank security barrier, reducing the amount of West Bank territory it encompasses and
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bringing it closer to the Green Line. It also forced open Route 443 connecting Mod’in
and Jerusalem to Palestinian traffic, even though it was believed vulnerable to
terrorism.16
Following the Flotilla incident, three petitions demanded information on the
whereabouts of all or some of the passengers after they were taken into custody, but they
were rejected. Further, the court stated that it supported the IDF’s actions on the Mavi
Marmara saying, “the soldiers were forced to respond in order to defend their lives.
Unfortunately, the action ended with the loss of lives. Nine people were killed and
soldiers and flotilla participants were wounded.”17
Israel also has a wide ranging network of non-governmental organizations, many
of which act as watchdogs on Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories. Following the
Flotilla incident, the major organizations, including the New Israel Fund and B’tselem,
expressed regret over the deaths of the Turkish nationals, as well as a desire to see the
blockade of Gaza eased and an internal investigation on the incident. However, neither
discussed any concern over conflict with Turkey or whether the IDF should or should not
handle future flotillas in the same manner. Again, the argument that autonomous
institutions will place constraints on the executive branch’s ability to wage war is largely
moot. In this case the Israeli Supreme Court was in agreement with government actions
and policies, and Israeli NGOs were less interested in the events with Turkey as they
were with humanitarian issues inside Gaza.
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UN Palmer Report- Turkey
While the release of the UN Palmer Report did not bring Turks to the streets the
same way the Flotilla incident did, public opinion on the Turkish government changed
little over that span of time. Following the Report’s release Turkey made direct military
threats to Israel, with little to no public backlash. Additionally, Prime Minister Erdogan
and his AKP Party had been granted another term in office just two months before the
Report’s release with an overwhelming 50 percent of the vote. The public was not
pacific and it did not constrain the government’s ability to escalate conflict with Israel,
nor was the government held accountable by the public.
Additionally, at the time of the Report’s release the Turkish public was
experiencing a heightened sense of pride and elitism in the Middle East. As the Arab
Spring was picking up Turkey was being lauded as the example that revolution stricken
countries should strive to emulate.18 While the Arab Spring countries were keen to
understand Turkey’s democracy so as to implement it in their own states, Turkey’s
popularity coincided with its growing resistance to Israel and its reaction to the Report.
The Arab League Secretary-General Nabi Al-Arabi stated that Turkey’s reaction to the
report was appropriate and normal. “As far as I reviewed it, many facts have been
ignored in the UN report which shows the blockage of Gaza as legitimate. The decision
taken by Turkey is an appropriate and normal reaction. It is the decision which would be
expected from Turkey,” Al-Arabi said.19 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu voiced support for Turkey’s reaction and its
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expulsion of Israel’s ambassador and severing of military ties. Ihsanoglu said that “Israel
should be compelled to lift this embargo and be held accountable for all its illegal
actions.”20
In November 2011, the Brookings Institute’s Shibley Telhami conducted an Arab
public opinion poll in which he surveyed 3,000 people from various Arab countries.
Fifty percent polled thought that Turkey had played the most constructive role in the
Arab Spring. Twenty-two percent polled said the leader they admired most outside of
their own country was Prime Minister Erdogan (the next closest was Hassan Nasrallah
with 13 percent). Of the 750 Egyptians polled, 44 percent said they wanted their next
leader to be like Prime Minister Erdogan (the next closest was King Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia with 9 percent).21
The AKP’s handling of the Palmer Report did get met with criticism from the
main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Its leader, Kemal
Kilicdaroglu, stated that Erodgan’s decision to cut military ties and expel the Israeli
ambassador was “pointless…no good can come of it and there is no need for us to risk
our interest with petty actions.”22 As for the threats to send the Turkish navy to escort
ships to break the blockade of Gaza, Kilicdaroglu called on Erdogan to “justify” them in
Parliament, stating that the Red Crescent was already sending aid to Gaza without
breaching the blockade.23
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Regardless of the CHP’s sentiments, it is important to note that their power was
significantly limited. The party won only 26 percent of the vote in the previous election,
was headed by new leadership, was suffering from infighting, and was still struggling to
come up with a platform and identity that would make it a credible and relevant party.24
Further, its reputation was slightly tarnished after a scandal in which its former long-time
leader was videotaped having an affair with a former colleague. Thus, there was little
reaction to the party’s complaints, and legislative constraint on the government was
minimal.
As stated before, no Turkish institution or entity had more to lose from a war with
Israel than the military. However, it neither intervened nor made significant verbal
objections following both the downgrading of diplomatic ties with Israel and the
suspension of all military associations following the release of the Report. Furthermore,
it did nothing when Erdogan threatened Israel by stating that the Turkish navy would
escort future humanitarian missions to break the blockade of Gaza. As noted earlier,
even though the military’s autonomy has been reduced by the AKP party over the last
several years, it is still extremely powerful. In a poll conducted by Yilmaz Esmer of
Bahcesehir University under the auspices of the 2011 World Values Survey, 75 percent
of Turks polled supported the military. Though that number is down from 94 percent in
1996, it is still significant. Murat Somer, associate professor of international relations at
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Koc University said about the poll, “…the image of the Turkish military traditionally has
been strong and some people rely on the military because they distrust the government.”25

UN Palmer Report- Israel
The UN Palmer Report was met in Israel with praise, thus offering the
government credibility and justification for its blockade of Gaza and its right to defend it.
Public opinion polls after the Flotilla incident suggested that Israelis supported the
blockade and the use of force to defend it. The Palmer Report only reinforced these
sentiments. The public was clearly not pacific, and the fact that it supported the
government’s policies again renders the questions of whether the public constrained the
government or held it accountable moot.
The Report was also released during Israel’s mass social protests in which
hundreds of thousands of people all over the country were marching in the streets
demanding social reforms. No reports can be found about protests relating to the
blockade of Gaza or Israel’s response to Turkey that it would not change its policies even
in the wake of Turkish threats or ultimatums.
The Israeli government’s position on the Flotilla and blockade of Gaza was
reinforced by the Report. As such, following the Report’s release and the subsequent
Turkish threats there were no constraints on the government by either the legislative
bureaucracy or powerful autonomous institutions, including major Israeli NGOs.
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Normative Constraints
Since there were few institutional constraints in the cases under study, we now
turn to another possible explanation: normative constraints. According to the normative
constraints logic of DPT, democracies intentionally externalize domestic democratic
preferences for solving conflicts peacefully and finding ways to reconcile and
compromise. These shared norms in turn constrain two democracies from engaging in
conflict. According to Russett and Maoz:
democratic regimes are based on political norms that
emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful
means…Political conflicts in democracies are resolved
through compromise... This norm allows for an
atmosphere of ‘live and let live’...It follows that when two
democracies confront one another in conflicts of interest,
they are able effectively to apply democratic norms in their
interaction, thereby preventing most conflicts from
escalating to a militarized level, involving the threat,
display, or use of military force, and-of-course from going
to all-out war…disputes between democracies are more
likely to be settled by third-party conflict management, by
agreement or by stalemate.26
A byproduct of the shared norms logic is that democracies also trust one another, further
constraining them from having a conflict.27

Flotilla Incident
Based on the aftermath of the Flotilla incident, shared democratic norms do not
appear to have played a significant role in constraining the two countries from conflict.
Ankara immediately announced that it would recall its ambassador to Israel and call off
all military exercises with Israel. At the UN, only a day after the incident, Turkey’s
26
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Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu aggressively demanded an immediate Israeli apology,
an end to the blockade of Gaza, and international legal action against Israel.28
He also stated that “normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations was out of the
question,” unless Israel conformed with international law, which to Turkey meant lifting
the blockade, which they saw as illegal.29 One month after the incident Prime Minister
Erdogan said in a televised interview that an Israeli apology would be a condition for
continued Turkish mediation in any future peace talks between Israel and Syria. He also
stated that Israel must provide reparations for those killed in the operation.30 Further,
there were reports coming out of Ankara that Turkish naval ships might escort future
flotillas to Gaza.
Israeli officials were not as vocal or verbally aggressive as the Turkish
government, nor did they take any diplomatic action. When the Israeli Prime Minister
found out about the Flotilla situation, he was in Canada meeting with Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper. At a photo-op he announced that he was cancelling a trip to the
US and going home to take care of the situation. In the statement he did not refer to
Turkey, speaking only of Israeli policy on the blockade. He commented: “regrettably in
this exchange at least 10 people died. We regret this loss of life. We regret any violence
that was there. We would like – I would like to wish speedy recovery to the wounded,
including to four of our own soldiers.”31 However, Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly
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responded to Turkey’s apology demand by saying that “Israel will not apologize for the
events.”32 He also continually stated that the blockade policy would not change,
regardless of international pressures.
Normative constraint logic also suggests that democracies have a mutual trust. As
a result, when a conflict of interest or disagreement does arise, this trust constrains them
from resorting to violence.33 In this case, trust between Turkey and Israel was obviously
absent. The Turkish Metro Poll Strategic and Social Research Center (Metro Poll)
conducted a two question public opinion poll to find out what Turks thought about the
Flotilla situation. The first question asked was: “Why do you think Israel attacked the
Gaza flotilla?” The three response options given were: to halt a breach of the blockade;
to undermine the Turkish Prime Minister domestically and internationally; and “don’t
know.” Forty-five percent answered that they believed Israel wanted to discredit Prime
Minister Erdogan. Only 33.2 percent believed it was to enforce the blockade.34
Another public opinion poll conducted by Metro Poll in February 2011 found that
out of 2,000 Turks surveyed, 28 percent thought Israel was Turkey’s number one enemy.
Only America ranked higher at 42 percent.35 In April 2010, the BBC World Service Poll
found that 77 percent of Turks polled had negative views of Israel. In a 2009 Pew Global
Attitudes survey, 73 percent of Turks polled rated their opinions of Jews as “negative.”36
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Upon learning of the incident while on a trip in Chile, Prime Minister Erodgan
stated that Israel was guilty of “state terrorism.” Foreign Minister Davutoglu compared
the attacks to 9/11 for Turkey.37 This interpretation ignored the fact that the 9/11 attack
on the United States was pre-meditated and undertaken against civilians who were doing
nothing but going to work. The official Turkish Foreign Ministry press release on the
incident stated that “Israel has once again clearly demonstrated that it does not value
human life and peaceful initiatives through targeting innocent civilians.”38
Israel made it clear that it no longer trusted Turkey when it issued a travel
warning to Israelis. The warning stated: “in response to the events surrounding the
flotilla, there are growing protests by the government and public in Turkey. This delicate
state of affairs is liable to deteriorate into violent outbreaks against Israelis in Turkey.”39
Turkey had previously been known as a popular tourist spot for Israelis. Further, it
would be hard to imagine that Israeli officials would trust Turkey following the
diplomatic maneuvers and harsh and derisive general comments made about Israel
following the incident. Israel has also been suspicious, albeit quietly, about the
motivation of the AKP party since Prime Minister Erdogan invited Hamas officials to
Ankara in 2006.
The lack trust between Turkey and Israel in general is not surprising. After all,
the alliance has not been historically based on shared norms and values. The relationship
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has mainly been centered on the balance of power in the Middle East. Gaps in the
relationship can largely be attributed to Turkey’s desire to shift its policies away from the
West, in favor of the Arab states. Further, Turkey is a Muslim country and Israel Jewish,
each with a completely different ethnic makeup. Although the two work together, there
has traditionally been a deep seeded historical mistrust of Israel on the part of the Muslim
community. Likewise, Israel has traditionally mistrusted the Muslim world based on what
it perceives as continued Muslim hostility.
In view of the lack of trust, Turkey and Israel went to the brink of war following
the Flotilla incident. But as DPT normative constraint logic suggests, the two states
compromised by agreeing to an external intermediary in their efforts at reconciliation.
They both agreed to a UN international investigation of the incident. The reason for this
stems partly from both countries’ relationship with the United States.
At the time of the Flotilla, United States-Turkish relations were at an all-time low.
Ankara had recently refused to vote “yes” or even abstain from a UN vote to apply
heavier sanctions on Iran, and had failed to ratify the protocols on the establishment of
diplomatic relations with Armenia, both to the frustration of the United States.40 Going
to war with Israel would have put Turkey in a potentially irreconcilable situation with the
United States, as Israel and the United States have a “special relationship.” Further, it
would have created a very complicated situation with NATO, of which Turkey is a
member and the United States the main sponsor.
Turkey’s distancing and disagreements with the United States went hand in hand
with its increasing regional stature. However, Turkey’s relations with Washington and
40
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NATO have been crucial to its continued success. Over the last several decades, the
United States and NATO have helped build and maintain Turkey’s military, and have
provided a valuable deterrent.41 Going to war with Israel could have potentially halted
any future defense coordination, which was particularly important given the deteriorating
cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces and the Turkish military.
At the time, Israel’s relationship with the United States was also extremely
strained. The two had been clashing diplomatically over the Palestinian peace process.
United States President Barak Obama made peace a foreign policy priority upon his
inauguration as president. However, he was met with disdain on the part of Israeli
officials, who perceived his proposals as problematic and as putting unfair pressure on
the Israeli government.42 Tensions were exacerbated when settlement construction
increased. In one case of bad timing, Israel announced a major settlement construction
plan in East Jerusalem while United States Vice President Joe Biden was paying a visit.
The peace process issue by itself was not enough to endanger US-Israel relations.
But combined with a conflict with Turkey, a NATO member and a crucial US partner in
Iraq and the fight against terror, there would be an unprecedented strain on the
relationship. Israel could not afford to find itself in such a situation. Moreover, the
United States was playing a crucial role in pressing Iran to halt its nuclear program.
Israel believes that Iran is the most dangerous existential threat it has ever faced. The
Jewish state needs the United States to garner global support on this issue, as well as to
help Israel should it decide to attack Iranian facilities. While a conflict with Turkey may
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not have jeopardized the long-term health of the Israel-US relationship, it could have
significantly undermined and side-tracked US and Israeli efforts on the Iranian front.

UN Palmer Report
Like the Flotilla incident, DPT logic on shared democratic norms and trust played
no noticeable role in constraining conflict between Turkey and Israel following the
release of the UN Palmer Report. The Report was publicly leaked before its official
release date, and upon hearing that it would not favor Turkey’s stance on the legality of
the blockade Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated: “for us the deadline [for the
formal Israeli apology] is the day the UN report gets released, or we resort to Plan B.”43
He also said that “Turkey will be imposing sanctions that are well known by Israel and
some other international parties.”44
After the Report’s official release Prime Minister Erdogan rejected its credibility
and said that Turkey would still maintain the position that the blockade was illegal. His
position was supported by many in the international community, including a panel of five
independent UN rights experts reporting to the UN Human Rights Council.45 He also
stated that the Flotilla incident was “grounds for war.”46 Further, Turkey asked all top
Israeli diplomats to leave, including the Israeli ambassador, and suspended all military
ties.
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Israel officially accepted the Report, although it rejected a section of its findings
regarding the use of excessive force. In his official statement, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu said: “The State of Israel has adopted the Palmer Report, with the exception
of the reservations detailed by the Israeli representative to the Palmer Commission. As
advised in the report, Israel once again expresses its regret over the loss of life, but will
not apologize for its soldiers taking action to defend their lives.”47 In speaking about
Israel’s relationship with Turkey he said:
Israel cherishes the significant ties, past and present,
between the Turkish and Jewish peoples. For that reason,
the State of Israel has made numerous attempts in the last
few months to settle the dispute between the countries, but
regrettably, these attempts have not been successful. The
state of Israel hopes that a way will be found to move
beyond this discord and will continue its endeavors to that
end.
Nonetheless, Israel remained intransigent on issuing a formal apology as well as on
changing its Gaza policies.
Israeli hardline Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman went to the extreme of
suggesting that perhaps Israel should begin providing weapons to the PKK. He
threatened: “we’ll exact a price from Erdogan that will prove to him that messing with
Israel doesn’t pay off...Turkey better treat us with respect and common decency.”48
However, the Prime Minister’s office quickly distanced itself from Lieberman and called
for restraint with regards to all statements regarding Turkey.49
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The lack of trust between Turkey and Israel following the release of the Palmer
Report was even higher than after the Flotilla incident. Prime Minister Erdogan said that
Turkey would boost its naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea. “Turkish warships will
be tasked with protecting the Turkish boats bringing humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip,”
he said.50 There was also mistrust over energy resources. Israel had just recently begun
talks with Cyprus over energy sharing and Israel had also found a significant portion of
natural gasoline off its coast. “We have taken action to make sure that the natural
resources of the eastern Mediterranean will not benefit Israel alone…Israel is beginning
to say that it has the right to be active in exclusive economic zones…they do not have
that right,” Erdogan said.51
Following Turkish threats to use naval ships to escort future flotillas to Gaza and
to increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean, it was clear that Israel distrusted
Turkey and took the threats seriously. Israel stated that it would continue to defend the
blockade of Gaza and vowed to protect its gas rigs in the Mediterranean. When asked
about whether Israel would safeguard the gas platforms following the Turkish threat
Energy Minister Uzi Landau respondded, “That [is] the simple answer I can give.”52
In sum, shared democratic norms and trust played a minimal role in constraining
conflict between Turkey and Israel following the Palmer Report. However, as in the
Flotilla incident, even though the two states were on the brink physical conflict was
Haaretz, Sep. 9, 2011, Accessed Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/netanyahu-s-office-distances-itself-from-lieberman-s-planned-measures-against-turkey1.383561.
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somehow avoided. This time, however, there was no third party intervention in as much
as the tensions arose out of a third party (UN) attempt at reconciliation itself. Only 14
months had elapsed between the Flotilla incident and the Palmer report. The issues
surrounding both nations’ relationship with the United States remained. In fact, Israel’s
relationship with the United States had deteriorated even further since the Flotilla
incident following a controversial speech in which President Obama called for peace
negotiations with the Palestinians to be based on the 1967 borders-- something no
previous US president had every publicly said.
The Arab Spring uprisings had also spread to Syria where a protracted civil
conflict seemed inevitable. In view of this, the idea of conflict between Israel and Turkey
lost steam. Leading up to the Arab Spring Turkey had been working to improve its
relations with the Arab states, and in particular Syria. When conflict erupted Turkey, a
model of Islamic democracy, felt tremendous pressure on Turkey to intervene.53
Likewise, Israel turned its attention to that conflict, out of concern for its own security
being that there is no peace treaty between Israel and Syria. Israel is concerned about the
outcome as it relates to its own security. There is no peace treaty between Israel and
Syria. With the growing humanitarian crisis and violence in Syria, neither Israel nor
Turkey had any incentive to get involved in a conflict.
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Chapter 5- Conclusion
Democratic peace theory (DPT) can be said to have limited applicability to small
democratic powers such as Israel and Turkey. Balance of power and self-interest appear
to play a much larger role in determining outcomes in states that may share some
democratic norms, but are different culturally and ethnically. In Turkey’s case its current
interests lie more in deepening its relations with Middle Eastern Muslim states than with
Israel. Israel meanwhile, prioritizes its security, surrounded as it is by hostile states.
Size may be another factor. Small developing powers struggle to provide
economic, political, and military security for their citizens in the face of fewer resources
than their great power counterparts. Their immediate concerns are therefore likely to take
precedence in a crisis over values or norms. Small powers such as those in Europe opted
for historical neutralism in order to protect their interests. Today, with few security
concerns, they are focused on cooperation and conflict avoidance. On the other hand,
countries such as Turkey and Israel are still trying to determine how best to deal with
their security problems. While they are advanced and democratic enough to care about
peaceful conflict resolution, they may not always avoid verbal belligerence and
brinkmanship as a way to harness popular nationalism and to promote or defend their
interests.
In both Turkey and Israel, because the public and parliament were generally
supportive of government actions, institutional constraints played no identifiable part in
preventing conflict and were largely irrelevant. The general public was not found to be
pacific as DPT suggests, so the issue of constraining the government’s ability to engage
in physical conflict and thus hold them accountable was rendered moot. Furthermore,
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Rosato’s claim that leaders are more likely to lead than to give way to public opinion has
generally been supported historically by the hardline positions taken by successive Israeli
governments. Thus, even if public opinion in this case had been opposed, it is doubtful
whether the Israeli government would have given way.
Normative constraints also provided little explanation for why the two states
avoided physical conflict in both situations. Except for the fact that war was indeed
averted, neither country acted in line with the theory that their shared democratic norms
would lead them to trust each other or opt for a peaceful and compromising resolution.
Each made clear their willingness to escalate conflict if necessary, making direct and indirect threats towards one another. Both made provocations, either militarily or
politically, that put the other in a state of distrust. Instead, it is suggested here that both
Turkey’s and Israel’s relationships with the United States, which for both largely
revolves around political, military, and economic security, helped secure their restraint.
In the case of the Palmer Report, the outbreak of violence in Syria also added a
disincentive to wage war.
The case study did not address one topic which many DPT theorists argue is
important to halting conflict between democracies, economic interdependence. Turkey
and Israel have soaring trade, and outside of the military and tourism realms, this has
been largely unaffected by the recent transgressions.1 It is more than reasonable, even
likely, that these economic ties played a factor in halting conflict between the two.
However, this has no relation to the two being democracies, especially given the failings
of the logic behind institutional and normative constraints. Economic ties play just as
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large a role in halting conflict between democracies and authoritarian regimes as they do
between competing democracies. Thus, the world’s strongest democracies have had long
standing relationships with the oil rich Middle Eastern countries, even though they
continually engage in anti-Western violence and propaganda. In fact, in this case
Turkey’s growing relationship with Arab countries was actually an impetus to conflict
with Israel.
In reviewing the history of the Turkish-Israeli relationship, it comes as no surprise
that DPT was unable to offer an explanation for the avoidance of physical conflict. Since
its inception in the middle stages of the 20th century, the alliance has never been based on
democratic institutions, shared democratic principles, or trust. It was founded on regional
balance of power interests, shared ethnic isolation and individual state interests. As was
explained in chapter two, both have consistently used each other as balance of power
allies, with Turkey proving to be the more influential power in deciding when the alliance
would heat up or cool down. When Turkey wanted to be closer to the Arab states in the
1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, it distanced itself from Israel. When it wanted to increase
its connection to the West in the 1980s it upgraded and placed a higher importance on
relations with Israel. Since 2006 Turkey has shown signs of tilting back to the Arab
states, and harsh treatment of Israel has proven to be a quick and effective way to gain
credibility, popularity, and praise in the Middle East. While the alliance has been largely
dictated by Turkey, Israel’s interest in the relationship can also be largely found in its
desire to balance against its regional enemies.
Arab nationalism and pan-Islam were significant factors in Turkey and Israel
forming an alliance. The two countries shared a feeling of alienation based on ethnic
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identity, as well as protection of their secular ways of life. However, Arab nationalism
has subsided in recent years, and the Justice and Development Party has promoted its
conservative brand or politics in Turkey, eliminating a major reason for its union with
Israel.
Lastly, the Turkish-Israeli partnership has been largely driven by self-interest.
Turkey’s relationship with Israel really blossomed in the 1990s when it wanted closer ties
with the United States and the European Union. It was also interested in Israel’s military
resources, including hardware, training, and intelligence sharing. Similarly, in the 1950s
Israel was interested in getting closer to the United States, at the time a major ally of
Turkey. Later, Israel was interested in finding Muslim allies to help provide credibility,
regional stability, and deterrence against its neighbors. When Turkey made its desire to
re-align known in the 1980s, Israel was happy to oblige.
Overall, this case study challenges and helps disprove DPT as it relates to small
states. However, continued discussion and debate about the effects and applicability of
DPT, specifically in regard to small powers, should be continued, and has never been
more important or relevant. Countries that were once considered small powers-- Brazil,
India, and South Africa--- have seen their influence and power increase tremendously
throughout the last decade. There is a need to understand small power behavior,
especially as it relates to conflict. As the international political environment continues to
change, the international relations community needs to test and adapt its theories to new
circumstances.
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